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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4535 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAELPAUL J. FARRELL, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-07-00488-001) 
 District Judge:  Hon. Susan D. Wigenton 
 
Submitted September 22, 2011 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 27, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
Michaelpaul Farrell appeals the District Court‟s sentence of eighteen months 
imprisonment following his plea of guilty to violation of his supervised release.  Farrell 
contends that the District Court‟s sentence was both procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.   
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I.   
 
 We write principally for the benefit of the parties and recite only the facts essential 
to our disposition.  In April 2005, Farrell pled guilty to two counts of exchanging stolen 
U.S. savings bonds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 510(b) and two counts of making false 
statements to the U.S. Department of the Treasury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  On 
the basis of that plea bargain, Farrell was sentenced on January 19, 2006 to 15 months‟ 
imprisonment, three year‟s supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution.   
 Some time after Farrell had served his prison sentence, the Probation Office filed a 
revocation petition against him.  He pled guilty to one of the alleged violations, and on 
January 26, 2009, was sentenced to six months‟ confinement at a community correctional 
facility and a 30 month term of supervised release.  Following an infraction during his 
time in the community correctional facility, he served the balance of the six month 
sentence in prison, before beginning the 30 month term of supervised release.  During 
that period of supervised release, Probation filed another revocation petition against 
Farrell, charging five violations of supervised release, carrying a Guidelines range of 5-
11 months‟ imprisonment. 
 On November 17, 2010, Farrell pled guilty to one of the five violations--failure to 
notify his probation officer of changes in employment or address.  Farrell‟s counsel asked 
the District Court to sentence Farrell within the Guidelines range, while the Government 
recommended an upward variance.  The District Court subsequently sentenced Farrell to 
18 months‟ imprisonment.  Farrell filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e), 
and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  “This Court reviews 
the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a district court‟s sentence upon 
revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Young, 634 
F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2011).  For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “the 
sentencing court must give rational and meaningful consideration to the relevant § 
3553(a) factors.”  Id.  Further, a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the sentencing 
authority fails “to adequately explain the chosen sentence - including an explanation for 
any deviation from the Guidelines range.”  “Substantive reasonableness inquires into 
whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, 
was premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors.”  Id. 
III. 
The District Court in the present case varied from the Guidelines range in 
sentencing Farrell.  Accordingly, we must consider whether the District Court provided 
an adequate explanation for its variance.  On appeal, Farrell claims that the District Court 
based its sentence exclusively on “erroneous factual findings regarding the . . . admitted 
and charged violations” and “Farrell‟s past conduct.”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 22.)  Farrell 
also contends that, in sentencing him, the District Court failed to properly consider his 
argument that his conduct was heavily influenced by his homelessness, unemployment, 
and family difficulties.  When, as is the case here, a defendant‟s “asserted procedural 
error is purely factual, our review is highly deferential and we will conclude there has 
been an abuse of discretion only if the district court‟s findings are clearly erroneous.”  
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United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).  This highly deferential standard 
of review allows us to overturn the District Court‟s decision only if the challenged 
findings are “completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility” or are without “rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”  
United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1991). 
At sentencing, the District Court expressly relied on several elements of the record 
in choosing to vary upward from the Guidelines range.  Specifically, the District Court 
considered the four violations with which Farrell had been charged, but to which he had 
not pled guilty, as well as his history of criminal conduct and previous violations.  The 
District Court stated that those violations all indicated that Farrell was “thumbing [his] 
nose at the court.”  The District Court also expressed concern that Farrell‟s activity was 
“reckless behavior that only escalates and becomes that much more dangerous, not only 
for [Farrell], but for other people.”  In short, the District Court concluded that it was 
“appropriate to vary upward because [the court did not] think [Farrell‟s] attention has 
been gotten . . . and because [Farrell has shown no] . . . attempt to comply with the terms 
of [his] supervised release, [and has not] . . . made any effort whatsoever, obviously, to 
make restitution.”1 
Our review of these justifications for variance reveals that they are supported by 
record evidence, and accordingly, that it was within the District Court‟s broad discretion 
to rely upon them in varying from the Guidelines range.  We consider these justifications 
in turn. 
                                              
1
 Restitution had been ordered along with his initial imprisonment. 
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The District Court characterized the violations alleged against Farrell, along with 
his extensive criminal history, as indicative of a lack of respect for the court.  While it 
was not an inescapable conclusion that Farrell‟s continuing criminal activity could be 
attributed to a lack of respect for the court and its authority, such a conclusion was not 
inconsistent with the evidence before the District Court, and therefore, the conclusion 
was not clearly erroneous. 
Even by his own admission, Farrell has not been a model law-abiding citizen.  In 
our view, the District Court‟s consideration of his extensive criminal background was 
appropriate.  Furthermore, in light of the violation to which Farrell pled guilty and the 
other violations constituting relevant conduct, it was reasonable for the District Court to 
conclude that his criminal conduct was, in essence, continuing.  Viewed from that 
perspective, the District Court‟s conclusion that supervised release had failed to get 
Farrell‟s attention is a reasonable conclusion within its sentencing discretion. 
Farrell also claims that the District Court failed to properly consider his 
homelessness, unemployment, and difficult family circumstances in varying upward from 
the Guidelines range.  “In order for a sentence to be reasonable, the record must 
demonstrate that the sentencing court gave „meaningful consideration‟ to” all of the 
relevant arguments by the parties.  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 
2007).  A requirement that the sentencing court meaningfully consider arguments does 
not mean that the court must always be persuaded by those arguments, however.  The 
record is clear that the District Court considered Farrell‟s unfortunate circumstances, 
noting that “we [can] talk all day long about” the various problems he faced.  While 
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Farrell understandably disagrees with the District Court‟s conclusion after considering 
those factors, the District Court clearly satisfied its obligation to consider these 
arguments as raised by Farrell‟s counsel. 
IV. 
 Having concluded that Farrell‟s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable, we 
turn now to the question of whether it was substantively reasonable.  By Farrell‟s own 
acknowledgment, his claim of substantive unreasonableness overlaps heavily with his 
claim of procedural unreasonableness.  In challenging a sentence as substantively 
unreasonable, “[t]he party challenging the sentence bears the burden of proving its 
unreasonableness.”  Id. at 543.  Our review of such a challenge is “highly deferential.”  
Id.  In the present appeal, Farrell has not sustained his burden of showing the sentence to 
be substantively unreasonable.  In addition to duplicating his earlier arguments that the 
District Court relied on improper factors and considerations in formulating the sentence, 
Farrell contends that the 18 months‟ incarceration to which he was sentenced was higher 
than necessary to achieve the statutory goals of incarceration. 
 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) requires the District Court to consider a number of statutory 
factors in setting a sentence.  As relevant to Farrell, the District Court was required to 
consider, inter alia, the nature and circumstances of his offense and history, the need to 
deter additional criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public from further crimes 
committed by Farrell.  As previously discussed, the District Court reasonably concluded 
that a significant period of incarceration would be necessary to get Farrell‟s attention and 
prevent him from further recidivism.  His past history and apparent lack of reform also 
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indicate that a lengthier sentence is reasonable under the statutory factors.  It was within 
the broad discretion of the District Court to determine that 18 months‟ incarceration was 
the appropriate period of time required to serve the relevant statutory purposes. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
